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WHAT CONSTITUTES “CUSTODY” UNDER 
MIRANDA?: AN EXAMINATION OF MAINE’S TEST 
AS APPLIED IN STATE V. KITTREDGE 
Elizabeth L. Tull* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, 
has issued several opinions addressing whether a defendant’s statements are 
admissible when made to law enforcement in the absence of “Miranda warnings.”1  
These cases have similar features: a defendant made a personally incriminating 
statement; raised an appeal alleging that Miranda warnings should have been, but 
were not, read to him or her; and the Court—in many cases—determined that the 
defendant was not technically in police custody, and thus there was no requirement 
to recite Miranda warnings to him or her. 
Miranda warnings are an important safeguard that citizens of the United States 
are afforded to protect themselves from self-incrimination.2  One reason these 
warnings are so crucial to a fair defense is because a “defendant’s confession . . . 
‘has long been regarded as powerfully incriminating’ evidence” in a criminal trial.3  
In fact, a confession is likely “‘the most probative and damaging evidence that can 
be admitted against [a defendant]’” because it is direct evidence of facts “‘from the 
actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of 
information.’”4   
Because confessions have such a powerful impact in a criminal case, it is 
important that Miranda warnings are delivered at a point in time when a defendant 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Maine School of Law.  The author would like to thank 
Professor Deirdre Smith for her helpful insights and guidance in developing this Note, the Maine Law 
Review editors and staff for their assistance throughout the editing process, and her family and friends 
for their support. 
 1. See, e.g., State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106; State v. Bryant, 2014 ME 94, 97 A.3d 
595; State v. Lowe, 2013 ME 92, 81 A.3d 360; State v. Jones, 2012 ME 126, 55 A.3d 432; State v. 
Dion, 2007 ME 87, 928 A.2d 746; State v. Higgins, 2002 ME 77, 796 A.2d 50.  Per Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966), persons must be read certain warnings prior to a custodial interrogation.  
“An accused must be warned that he or she has the right to remain silent, that anything said can and will 
be used against him or her in court, that he or she has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the 
lawyer with him or her during interrogation, and that if he or she is indigent a lawyer will be appointed 
to represent him or her.”  22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §1263 (2015). 
 2. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Similarly, the Constitution of the State 
of Maine provides that “[t]he accused shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself 
or herself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, property or privileges, but by judgment of that person’s peers 
or the law of the land.”  Me. Const. art. I § 6. 
 3. Dennis J. Braithwaite, Coerced Confessions, Harmless Error: The “Guilty as Hell” Rule in 
State Courts, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 233, 233 (2013) (quoting Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, 
On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 
21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 469 (1997)). 
 4. Id. at 233-34 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40 (1968) (White, J., 
dissenting)). 
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can make a meaningful, informed choice about whether or not to disclose self-
incriminating information.  Although the rights listed in these warnings may seem 
obvious to some, research has indicated that there are misconceptions about the 
extent to which people understand their rights and the content of Miranda 
warnings.  In a recent study, researchers set out to determine the extent to which 
“members of the American public possess a working knowledge of their Miranda 
rights.”5  Researchers asked several hundred participants to freely recall a Miranda 
warning and fill out quizzes about Miranda’s protections.6  The results indicated 
that only 54.3 percent of the participants were deemed “knowledgeable” about the 
basic components of Miranda warnings, and “more than two thirds of the 
[participants] misbelieved that Miranda applied in noncustodial situations.”7  The 
results of this study are indicative of the importance of reading Miranda warnings 
to suspects as a reminder of the rights afforded to them by the Constitution, as the 
content of these warnings is not necessarily common knowledge. 
There is an important limitation to the scope of Miranda’s protection.  
Confessions obtained during a custodial interrogation are usually inadmissible at 
trial unless the suspect was Mirandized.8  However, if a suspect is not legally “in 
custody” during an interview or interrogation, there is no requirement that the 
suspect have been read Miranda warnings.9  In such situations, any confessions 
may be used at trial against a defendant to prove guilt, even if the defendant 
declines to testify.10 
After a brief review of Miranda, this Note will examine the method used by 
Maine courts to determine whether a person is legally considered “in custody,” 
which is predicated upon ten factors related to the circumstances of a person’s 
interview or interrogation.11  This Note will then explore how the Law Court 
applied these factors in its 2014 opinion in State v. Kittredge.12  After providing a 
critique of the Law Court’s analysis in Kittredge, this Note will argue that Maine’s 
ten-factor test may lead to inconsistent results in determining whether an interview 
is or is not custodial and should thus be reexamined to ensure more consistent 
custodial determinations in future cases.  Potential remedies for the test could 
include implementing a more thorough, extensive review of each of the ten factors 
in every case, rather than focusing on just one or a few factors; reintroducing a 
                                                                                                     
 5. Richard Rogers et. al., General Knowledge and Misknowledge of Miranda Rights: Are Effective 
Miranda Advisements Still Necessary? 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 432, 434 (2013) (citations 
omitted). 
 6. Id. at 435.  Participants were a diverse, educated group of individuals randomly drawn from the 
Dallas County, Texas, jury pool, which researchers created by combining the State’s driver’s license list 
and voter registration list.  Id. 
 7. Id. at 436-37. 
 8. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. 
 9. See id.  The Court in Miranda supports its holding by reasoning that “when an individual is 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities, the privilege against self-
incrimination is jeopardized.”  Id.  Thus, the need for “procedural safeguards”—Miranda warnings—is 
only implicated by a custodial interrogation and is not necessary in a noncustodial situation. 
 10. This was the case in Kittredge.  The defendant, Karl Kittredge, declined to testify, but the 
officer who obtained his confession testified under a hearsay exception as to the information Kittredge 
disclosed to him.  Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ ¶ 11-12, 97 A.3d 106. 
 11. State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222. 
 12. 2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106. 
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defendant-specific factor to the “in custody” analysis, such as the subjective intent 
of the officer or the subjective belief of the defendant as to whether or not he or she 
is in custody during an interview; or, implementing a policy that incentivizes the 
recording of interviews with suspects to ensure that important facts about the 
circumstances of an interrogation are correctly relayed to the Law Court and 
considered when applying the ten-factor test.  Ultimately, Maine’s test should be 
revisited to ensure that it provides adequate protection of a person’s right to avoid 
self-incrimination when applied. 
II.  A REVIEW OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court decided one of its most important 
cases: Miranda v. Arizona.13  In Miranda, a man named Ernesto Miranda was 
arrested and taken into custody at a police station in Phoenix, Arizona.14  He was 
brought to an interrogation room where he was questioned by two police officers.15  
After about two hours, the officers had obtained a signed, written confession from 
Miranda.16  The statement he signed included a paragraph stating that his 
“confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and 
with full knowledge of [his] legal rights, understanding any statement [he made] 
may be used against [him].”17  At his jury trial, Miranda’s written confession was 
admitted as evidence over the defense counsel’s objection, and the officers who 
interrogated him testified that he made an oral confession as well.18  A jury found 
Miranda guilty of rape and kidnapping.19  The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed 
the conviction on appeal, holding there was no violation of Miranda’s 
constitutional rights when his confession was obtained.20 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed.21  The Court found that Miranda 
was never informed of his right to consult with a lawyer or to have a lawyer present 
during the police interrogation.22  Further, the Court determined that Miranda’s 
right to avoid self-incrimination was “not effectively protected in any other 
manner.”23  For these reasons, the Court held that Miranda’s statements were 
inadmissible.24  In its holding, the Court explained that “the prosecution may not 
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 
                                                                                                     
 13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); CNN Library, Top U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Fast Facts, CNN (June 
21, 2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/21/us/top-u-s-supreme-court-decisions-fast-facts/; 
Landmark Supreme Court Cases, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-
resources/get-informed/supreme-court/landmark-supreme-court-cases.aspx. 
 14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 491-92. 
 17. Id. at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”25  The 
Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way.”26 
Prior to Miranda, statements were only deemed inadmissible upon a showing 
that they were obtained by “techniques and methods offensive to due process” or in 
situations when it was clear that the suspect was unable to exercise “a free and 
unconstrained will.”27  Following Miranda, the new procedural safeguards require 
that “[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed.”28  The Miranda decision stands for the proposition that many 
previously admissible statements must now be suppressed because of the 
presumption “that statements made while in custody and without adequate 
warnings were protected by the Fifth Amendment.”29   
The Court justified these new requirements by reasoning that “[t]he Fifth 
Amendment is . . . fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the 
expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege [is] 
simple.”30  Further, it said that courts may merely speculate as to a defendant’s 
personal characteristics or feelings that contribute to an assumption that he or she is 
in custody, but “a warning is a clear-cut fact . . . and a warning at the time of the 
interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and insure that the 
individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.”31  
However, while the Court noted the “recurrent argument . . . that society’s need for 
interrogation outweighs the privilege [of a person to remain silent],”32 it explained 
that the “limits [it had] placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an 
undue interference” with the job of law enforcement because the “decision does not 
in any way preclude police from carrying out their traditional investigatory 
functions.”33  In a later case, the Court reiterated that “[Miranda’s] safeguards were 
not intended to ‘create a constitutional straightjacket,’ but rather to provide 
practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination.”34 
                                                                                                     
 25. Id. at 444. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1940). 
 28. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  The Court also explains that a person may waive these rights 
“provided that waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”  Id.  Further, if a person 
requests to speak with an attorney at any point during an interrogation the questioning must stop, and the 
fact that a person “answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not 
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering” further questions until speaking with an attorney.  Id. 
at 444-45. 
 29. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985). 
 30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. 
 31. Id. at 468-69. 
 32. Id. at 479. 
 33. Id. at 481. 
 34. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). 
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III.  DETERMINING IF A SUSPECT IS “IN CUSTODY” 
An important feature of Miranda warnings is that they are only required for 
statements made during custodial interrogations, so an individual must be legally 
“in custody” to receive their benefit.35  The Supreme Court has emphasized on 
many occasions that determining if a suspect is “in custody” is an objective, not 
subjective, analysis.36  There are two key inquiries essential to this determination: 
first, evaluating the circumstances surrounding the interview or interrogation; and 
second, deciding if a reasonable person under those circumstances would have felt 
he or she could terminate the interrogation.37  Ultimately, the determinative 
question is whether the person was subject to “a formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”38  The 
Supreme Court did not list specific circumstances to consider when making this 
determination, instead requiring courts and police officers to “examine all of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including those that would have 
affected how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would perceive his or 
her freedom to leave.”39  Recent cases have clarified that this inquiry is inherently 
objective,40 and the subjective views or mindset of the police officers or of the 
person being questioned are irrelevant and not to be considered.41 
In Maine, the Law Court has developed its own objective test to determine 
whether a suspect is in custody.42  Similar to the United States Supreme Court’s 
standard, the basic principle of Maine’s test is that “an interrogation is custodial if 
‘a reasonable person standing in the shoes of [the defendant] would have felt he or 
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’”43  The Law Court 
has developed a non-exhaustive list of ten factors for courts to consider in making 
this determination: 
(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements; 
(2) the party who initiated the contact; 
(3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent 
communicated to the defendant); 
(4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant, 
to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position 
would perceive his or her freedom to leave; 
(5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the 
extent the officer’s response would affect how a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position would perceive his or her freedom to leave; 
(6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
position would perceive it); 
(7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings; 
                                                                                                     
 35. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
 36. J.D.B. v. North Carolina 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011). 
 37. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). 
 38. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). 
 39. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)). 
 42. See State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222. 
 43. State v. Jones, 2012 ME 126, ¶ 22, 55 A.3d 432 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 
Prescott, 2012 ME 96, ¶ 10, 48 A.3d 218). 
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(8) the number of law enforcement officers present; 
(9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and 
(10) the duration and character of the interrogation.44   
Courts are to “consider these factors ‘in their totality, not in isolation.’”45  
Essentially, a court must “weigh” these factors to determine if a person is in 
custody.46 
  The Law Court first presented these factors as a group in 1998 in State v. 
Michaud.47  The test developed as a compilation of factors from prior state and 
federal circuit court decisions, which have changed substantially over the years: 
earlier “in custody” tests considered several subjective factors, including the 
subjective intent of the law enforcement officer(s) and the subjective beliefs of a 
suspect or defendant. 
In State v. Inman,48 one of Maine’s earliest post-Miranda cases that dealt with 
a dispute as to whether an interview was or was not custodial, the Law Court relied 
on case law from several jurisdictions in determining what facts should be 
considered in the custody analysis.49  These factors included whether the defendant 
was restrained when questioned,50 the “tone and technique” of the interrogation,51 
the location where the questioning took place,52 whether there was probable cause 
for arrest,53 and the subjective intent of the police.54  A few years later the Law 
Court presented revised criteria for determining whether an individual is in 
custody, explaining that consideration may be given to where statements were 
made, which party initiated the contact, the existence of probable cause for arrest, 
the subjective views of the police, the subjective belief of the suspect, and the 
investigation’s focus.55   
In 1985, in State v. Thibodeau, these six factors were confirmed by the Court 
as the proper criteria to consider in a custodial analysis.56  Just one year later, 
however, the subjective criteria from Thibodeau were abandoned in State v. 
Gardner.57  In that case, the Court explained that courts should consider whether 
the suspect was questioned in a place with which he or she was familiar, the 
number of law enforcement officers present during the interrogation, the amount of 
physical restraint exercised against the suspect, the duration of the interrogation, 
and its character.58  The ten-factor test adopted by the Michaud Court derived in 
                                                                                                     
 44. Id. (quoting Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222). 
 45. Id. (quoting Prescott, 2012 ME 96, ¶ 11, 48 A.3d 218). 
 46. See State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 18, 97 A.3d 106 (explaining that “several factors weigh 
against a finding of custody” when analyzing the factors). 
 47. 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222. 
 48. 350 A.2d 582 (Me. 1976). 
 49. Id. at 598. 
 50. Id. (citing United States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
 51. Id. (citing People v. Arnold, 426 P.2d 515 (Cal. 1967)). 
 52. Id. (citing Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968)). 
 53. Id. (citing United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. State v. Cochran, 425 A.2d 999 (Me. 1981) (citing Montos, 421 F.2d at 223). 
 56. 496 A.2d 635, 640-41 (Me. 1985). 
 57. 509 A.2d 1160 (Me. 1986). 
 58. Id. at 1163 (citing United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 961 n.13 (1st Cir. 1986)). 
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part from these earlier cases59 and from Stansbury v. California—a 1994 United 
States Supreme Court case expressly stating that “the initial determination of 
custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the 
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being 
questioned.”60 
The ten factors from Michaud are regularly considered by Maine courts to 
determine whether a defendant is in custody and often lead to courtroom dispute.61  
Issues arise regarding whether or not certain factors are satisfied and how 
circumstances surrounding an interview contribute to whether a person was “in 
custody.”  The case of State v. Kittredge62 is an example of when such a dispute led 
to litigation. 
IV.  THE “IN CUSTODY” TEST IN STATE V. KITTREDGE 
A.  Facts of the Case 
In State v. Kittredge, the Law Court considered a challenge to a trial court’s 
denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress self-incriminating statements made in 
the absence of Miranda warnings.63  The defendant, Karl Kittredge, confessed to 
his involvement in a burglary during an interview with police and was found guilty 
by a jury after a trial in which he did not testify, but his statements were admitted 
as evidence against him.64 
The facts, as recited by the Law Court in its opinion, were as follows: 
sometime in early 2012, Kittredge had installed a safe in a bedroom belonging to 
his wife’s friend, Vicki Lachance,65 so that she could store her prescription 
medications and other valuable items in a secure place.66  At the time, Kittredge 
was on probation because he pled guilty to several counts of theft and burglary in 
2008.67  On June 11, Ms. Lachance complained of a headache and Kittredge’s wife 
took her to the hospital.68  After his wife left, Kittredge had a discussion with his 
adult son, Karl Kittredge Jr. (Karl Jr.), and his friend, Patty Raymond,69 about the 
                                                                                                     
 59. Both Thibodeau and Gardner are cited to for support of the factors in Michaud.  State v. 
Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222.   
 60. 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994). 
 61. See supra note 1. 
 62. 2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106. 
 63. Id. ¶ 1.  In addition to challenging the denial of his motion to suppress a confessions, the 
defendant also appealed on the grounds that the court “improperly presented to the jury an uncharged 
count of theft by receiving stolen property” and that there was insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for this charge.  Id.  This note will only review the portions of the case relevant to the 
challenge of the motion to suppress. 
 64. Id. 
 65. While the Law Court did not use the victim’s name in its opinion, names of the victim and 
others involved were referenced in the recitation of facts in the briefs filed by appellant and appellee.  
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1, State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106 (No. Ken-13-439) 
[hereinafter Blue Br.]; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106 
(No. Ken-13-439) [hereinafter Red Br.]. 
 66. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 2, 97 A.3d 106. 
 67. Id. ¶ 3. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See supra note 65. 
2015] STATE V. KITTREDGE 421 
fact that Ms. Lachance had certain medications at her house.70  Karl Jr. left to go to 
an undisclosed destination and later called Kittredge and Ms. Raymond on the 
phone requesting that they pick him up.71  When Kittredge and Ms. Raymond 
stopped to pick up Karl Jr. in a vacant lot near Ms. Lachance’s house, Kittredge 
saw that his son had a bag with Ms. Lachance’s safe in it.72  Kittredge then drove to 
his mother’s house and took some of the pills that were in the safe.73 
When Ms. Lachance arrived back home, she saw that the safe was missing.74  
She had more than $1,000 worth of “medications, including oxycodone, jewelry, 
and cash” in the safe.75  There was a video surveillance system in Ms. Lachance’s 
home, but the tape had been removed.76  Kittredge had known that her home had a 
surveillance system because he had seen the cameras during a visit.77   
On August 16, 2012, Kittredge went to meet with his probation officer at the 
officer’s request.78  The meeting took place in the probation office.79  Two state 
troopers, armed and in uniform, met Kittredge when he arrived and the three of 
them went into a room and sat down.80  As described in the Law Court’s opinion, 
the state troopers informed Kittredge that he was not under arrest but that they 
wanted to talk with him about something that had happened at Ms. Lachance’s 
residence.81  Neither of the troopers read Miranda warnings to Kittredge.82  The 
door to the room was closed but unlocked; Kittredge knew that he was able to leave 
the room, but he was not sure that he would be permitted to leave the building he 
was in.83  There was a tape recorder in the room, but the interview was not recorded 
for unknown reasons.84 
The troopers told Kittredge that they knew he was involved in the incident 
based on comments from others, but Kittredge denied any involvement.85  The 
troopers told Kittredge several times that another witness gave them information 
that led them to believe Kittredge was not telling the truth.86  Kittredge eventually 
“broke down and said ‘that friggen son of mine,’” and made self-incriminating 
statements.87  The trial court found that the troopers did not make any promises to 
                                                                                                     
 70. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 4, 97 A.3d 106. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. ¶ 5. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.   
 78. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.  The Law Court does not indicate in its opinion why this meeting was called, but 
Kittredge’s brief explains that Ms. Lachance “came under a belief that [Kittredge’s son] had been 
involved with the taking of her safe” and that “[t]his belief motivated the investigating officers to 
attempt to interrogate [Kittredge] about the safe.”  Blue Br. at 4. 
 79. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 7, 97 A.3d 106. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. ¶ 8. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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Kittredge, but told him that he “should cooperate because it might help him with 
the district attorney’s office” and that “it was best to tell the truth.”88  Additionally, 
the troopers did not make any threats, physically restrain Kittredge in any way, or 
“make threatening gestures.”89   The interview lasted forty-five to sixty minutes,90 
and when the questioning concluded, Kittredge left the office.91 
Kittredge was charged with burglary and theft by unauthorized taking or 
transfer in November 2012 and was indicted in January 2013.92  He filed a motion 
to suppress the statements he made at the probation office,93 but his motion was 
denied.94  The trial court held that “Kittredge spoke voluntarily and that Miranda 
warnings were not required because Kittredge was not in custody.”95  A two-day-
long jury trial on the charges was held in August 2013.96  One of the state troopers 
who was at the interview with Kittredge testified that “Kittredge admitted to him 
that he had picked up his son, had driven to his mother’s house . . . had seen the 
victim’s safe inside his son’s duffel bag, and had taken oxycodone pills from the 
safe.”97  Kittredge exercised his right not to testify.98   The jury found Kittredge not 
guilty of burglary, but guilty of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer of property 
that it determined was worth more than $1,000.99  Kittredge was subsequently 
sentenced to five years in prison, with all but forty-two months suspended, 
followed by a two-year probation period and an obligation to pay $3,975.99 in 
restitution to the victim.100  Kittredge appealed.101 
B.  Arguments on Appeal 
In Kittredge’s brief, he addressed each of the ten Michaud factors and applied 
them to the circumstances of his interrogation to argue that he was in custody 
during his interview at the probation office. 102  He argued that the trial court erred 
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in its denial of his motion to suppress because “[e]very single prong of the 
aforementioned [ten-factor] test [was] a positive result for custodial 
interrogation.”103  Some of the assertions he made to support his contention were: 
“the trial court found that [Kittredge] did not feel at liberty to leave”;104 that 
Kittredge was called into his probation office—a law enforcement setting—by his 
probation officer but was directed to a room where police officers were waiting for 
him, which contributes to the custodial setting and the party who initiated the 
contact;105 the officers made it clear to Kittredge that he was being investigated and 
the officers accused him of lying, which contributes to the existence of probable 
cause to arrest;106 “the police clearly and plainly manifested to [Kittredge] that he 
was not free to leave” and that “a reasonable person in [Kittredge]’s position would 
not feel free to leave”;107 he was not in familiar surroundings and that a police 
station or probation office is “the opposite of a familiar surrounding” for an 
ordinary person;108 there was no reason to have two officers present aside from 
creating “an environment of intimidation”;109 and “the interrogation went on and on 
until the officers were able to break [Kittredge] down,” lending to the character of 
the interview.110 
The State, in its brief, also used the ten-factor test as the basis for determining 
whether the interview was custodial.111  It asserted that the trial court correctly 
determined that Kittredge was not in custody for a number of reasons:  
The officers told Kittredge that he was not under arrest; [t]he interview lasted 45 
minutes to an hour; [o]nly two officers were present during the interview; [t]he 
officers made no threats, promises, or inducements to Kittredge; [t]here were no 
physical restraints of any kind used on Kittredge; Kittredge drove himself to his 
probation office; Kittredge was seated in a conference room in his probation office 
next to a door that was unlocked with respect to him; Kittredge was very polite 
and very cooperative throughout the interview; Kittredge . . . did not suffer any 
kind of incapacitating emotional or mental health meltdown during the interview; 
[t]he officers did not communicate to Kittredge that they had probable cause to 
arrest him; [t]he officers did not tell Kittredge that he was the focus of their 
investigation.112 
To support its contentions, the State cited a recent Law Court case, State v. 
Poblete,113 which held that an interview is not custodial even when it takes place at 
a police station;114 there was little discussion of the other factual circumstances that 
the State cited as support for its contention that the interview was not custodial. 
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C.  The Law Court’s Decision 
In affirming the trial court’s denial of Kittredge’s motion to suppress, the Law 
Court noted that because it was clear that Kittredge was subject to interrogation its 
review of the case would focus on the question of whether Kittredge was in custody 
during the interrogation.115  The Court considers this determination a question of 
both fact and law, giving deference to the trial court’s factual findings, but 
reviewing de novo whether a person was legally in custody.116  In such cases, the 
question presented is whether the trial court’s findings of fact “‘demonstrate as a 
matter of law that a reasonable person in [the defendant]’s situation would have felt 
he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation.’”117   The ten factors 
presented in Michaud are what the Court traditionally considers when making this 
determination.118 
At the beginning of its analysis of whether Kittredge was in custody, the Law 
Court stated that: 
[S]everal factors weigh against a finding of custody: the troopers told Kittredge 
that he was not under arrest; Kittredge did not manifest any belief that he was not 
free to leave; he was in a familiar building that he had been in before, though not 
necessarily in that particular room; only two law enforcement officers were 
present during the interview; he was under no physical restraint; and the 
interrogation only lasted forty-five minutes to one hour in an unlocked room 
without any additional coercive conditions.119 
The Court also listed factors that weighed in favor of a finding that Kittredge 
was in custody: 
Kittredge made the statements at the probation office where he was required to 
report; his probation officer—not he—initiated the contact; and the troopers 
communicated to Kittredge that they had information suggesting that he was 
involved in a crime, which suggested that he was a focus of the investigation.120 
The Law Court then began to analyze the factors.  The bulk of the Law Court’s 
discussion focused on the fact that Kittredge’s probation officer had called him to 
come to the probation office.121  Citing as authority several cases from the United 
States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions,122 the Court concluded “that the 
State’s exercise of its authority” in requiring Kittredge, or any probationer, to 
appear at his probation office “does not, standing alone, place the probationer in 
custody” for purposes of Miranda.123  The Court continued by pointing out that 
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“that the few factors that weigh in favor of a finding of custody are insufficient, 
without more, to establish that Kittredge was in custody.”124  The Court explained: 
Although Kittredge was called in by his probation officer upon suspicion of 
criminal conduct and was met by two troopers who wanted to interview him, the 
troopers told him that he was not under arrest, he subjectively realized that he 
could leave the room, he ultimately left without arrest, the interview was held in a 
building that was familiar to Kittredge, he was not physically restrained, he was 
not threatened in any way, the door was unlocked, only two troopers questioned 
him, and they concluded the interview within forty-five minutes to one hour.125 
The Court did not, however, go into detail about the significance of these 
factors.  Because the Court determined that Kittredge was not in custody, Miranda 
warnings were not necessary, and the trial court was not required to suppress his 
incriminating statements.126 
The Court then considered whether Kittredge’s statements were voluntary, as 
statements or confessions are not admissible in court unless made voluntarily—
even if they were not made in the context of a custodial interrogation.127  
Voluntariness must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.128  A 
confession is considered voluntary if it is made by the “free choice of a rational 
mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all of the 
circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair.”129 
In Kittredge, the primary issue relating to voluntariness was whether an 
“impermissible offer of leniency” had occurred when the troopers told Kittredge 
that he “should cooperate because it might help him with the district attorney’s 
office.”130  The Law Court reviewed previous cases in which statements were found 
not to be impermissible offers of leniency131 and ultimately concluded that the 
statements made to Kittredge were “vague and generalized” and were not 
impermissible.  As such, the trial court did not err in finding that Kittredge’s 
statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.132 
D.  Analysis 
In its opinion, the Law Court seemed to accept the State’s succinct list of 
reasons supporting the conclusion that Kittredge was not in custody.  A puzzling 
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aspect of the Law Court’s analysis in Kittredge, however, is its brief, non-
exhaustive application of the ten Michaud factors.  The Court only considered one 
aspect of the situation in depth—the fact that Kittredge’s probation officer 
requested that he come to the probation office—to support its conclusion that 
Kittredge was not in custody.133 
Further, the cases that the Law Court used to support its conclusion are 
distinguishable from Kittredge’s case.  The Law Court cited the United States 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Minnesota v. Murphy, a case factually similar to 
Kittredge in that a probation officer requested a meeting with the defendant after 
learning about possible criminal activity.134  During the meeting, the defendant 
made self-incriminating statements in the absence of Miranda warnings.135  In that 
case, however, the probation officer conducted the meeting alone; no police 
officers were present.136  The Minnesota Supreme Court barred the defendant’s 
confession because it determined that a probation officer may be able to coerce or 
“compel [a defendant’s] attendance and truthful answers.”137   The United States 
Supreme Court disagreed.  On appeal, the Court found that the fact that the 
interview took place at probation office made the interview less coercive because 
an interview conducted by a person’s probation officer “subjected [the defendant] 
to less intimidating pressure than is imposed on grand jury witnesses.”138  Unlike 
the interview in Murphy, Kittredge’s interview was not conducted by his less-
coercive probation officer—it was conducted by two armed state troopers.  This 
fact makes the Murphy case substantially different from Kittredge, and thus less 
persuasive as precedent. 
Similarly, in State v. Scott,139 an Ohio appeals court case cited by the Law 
Court, a probation officer asked a defendant to come to the probation office where 
he was subsequently interviewed by a sheriff.140  The sheriff told the defendant that 
he was not under arrest and he would be free to leave after the interview.141  After 
approximately fifteen minutes, the defendant expressed that he may have been 
involved in criminal activity, and at that point, the sheriff read him Miranda rights 
and began to record the rest of the interview.142  The court concluded that the 
defendant “was not formally arrested nor was there any restraint on his freedom of 
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest” when he made his initial 
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statements, so “he was not entitled to Miranda warnings” at that point.143  Like 
Murphy, this case is substantially different from Kittredge.  In Scott, the un-
Mirandized portion of the interview was short, and the defendant was read Miranda 
rights as soon as he began to make incriminating statements.  Kittredge was not 
read Miranda rights at any time during his interview with his probation officer. 
The Law Court nonetheless used these cases to establish that, by itself, the fact 
that Kittredge’s interview took place at his probation officer’s office did not 
indicate that Kittredge was in custody during the interview.  Not only were those 
cases readily distinguishable from Kittredge, but the Law Court failed to give much 
consideration to any of the other ten factors from Michaud.  Courts are supposed to 
consider the factors “in their totality, not [in] isolation.”144  What makes the 
analysis even more difficult is that there is not yet any explicit guidance or 
explanation as to how the ten factors should be weighed against each other or 
considered as a group.  Regarding the interview taking place in the probation 
office, even the case law the Law Court relied on did not examine how much 
weight to give to that fact in the context of other factors.  As it currently stands, the 
“in custody” test and analysis used by the Law Court leave substantial room for 
potentially inconsistent results when applied. 
An example of such an inconsistency is present in State v. Lowe, another 
recent Law Court decision involving a motion to suppress a confession, where the 
Court applied the factors to statements a suspect made to a state trooper while in a 
hospital.145  In that case, an eighteen-year-old girl named Kristina Lowe and three 
others were taken to the hospital after being involved in a single-car accident.146  
Soon after Lowe arrived, a police officer who was armed and in uniform requested 
to interview her about the accident.147  After questioning began, the trooper took a 
five-minute break and learned that two people had died in the accident and that 
Lowe was suspected to have been the driver of the car.148  Questioning resumed, 
and Lowe made incriminating statements without first being Mirandized.149  As in 
Kittredge, the Law Court recited the ten Michaud factors as what it would consider 
in determining whether the statements were made in a custodial situation.150  In its 
analysis in Lowe, the Court first stated that the trial court was correct in 
determining that hospitalization did not create a custodial situation on its own.151  
However, the Court determined that Lowe was in custody for several other reasons: 
the trooper had acquired information during the break that made the girl a suspect 
in a criminal case; the questioning was “focused, aggressive, and insistent;” the 
trooper urged Lowe to tell the truth; and the trooper failed to repeatedly tell Lowe 
that she was free to stop answering questions.152  The Court held that “[v]iewed 
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objectively, the information that the trooper learned over the break [in questioning] 
and communicated to Lowe produced a change in [her] liberty to end the 
interview” and concluded that “[a] reasonable person in [her] position would not 
have felt at liberty to end the interrogation.”153  Therefore, the Court determined 
that Lowe was in custody when she made statements to the police.154 
Inconsistency is present here because several of the circumstances that the 
Court determined had created a custodial interrogation in Lowe were present in 
Kittredge as well: the troopers had reason to suspect that Kittredge was involved in 
a crime and they expressed this belief to Kittredge; they told Kittredge that they did 
not believe he was telling the truth; the questioning was direct and focused; and the 
law enforcement officer had initiated the contact.155  Furthermore, additional 
factors were present in Kittredge that were not present in Lowe: there was not one, 
but two fully uniformed police officers present during Kittredge’s questioning; he 
was in a place associated with law enforcement; and, he was unsure he would be 
allowed to leave the building he was in.156  Notwithstanding these seemingly 
important parallels between the two cases, the Law Court came to two different 
results: Lowe’s interrogation was custodial; Kittredge’s was not.157 
V.  REVISITING MAINE’S “IN CUSTODY” TEST 
The different results in these two cases demonstrate that the ten-factor test 
from State v. Michaud is being applied inconsistently and may lead to different 
determinations of whether an interview is custodial in similar situations.  The test 
purports to be objective, but the benefits of an objective test are lost without more 
guidance and consistency in its application.  Several measures could be taken to 
achieve this result. 
A.  More Thorough Consideration of the Ten Factors 
In the Law Court’s analysis of the Michaud factors in Kittredge’s case, there 
was no explanation or cited precedent that indicated how the factors should be 
weighed against each other to determine whether an interview is custodial.  The 
Court identified circumstances that both supported and refuted a finding that 
Kittredge was not in custody, but did not expressly explain the weight or 
importance of these factors. 
In their briefs, Kittredge and the State had conflicting arguments regarding 
what factual circumstances should have been considered when the Law Court 
reviewed the trial court’s custody determination on appeal.158  It is possible that the 
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Court could have reached a different conclusion if it had placed more weight on 
certain other circumstances of Kittredge’s interview, such as “the party who 
initiated the contact,” the “existence . . . of probable cause to arrest (to the extent 
communicated to the defendant),” the subjective views that the police manifested to 
the defendant, the investigation’s focus, “the number of law enforcement officers 
present,” and the “duration and character of the interrogation.”159  As the Law 
Court recognized, the facts indicated that the probation officer requested the 
interview, the police had reason to suspect Kittredge of a crime and made him 
aware of this information, there was more than one state trooper present, and 
Kittredge was likely the focus of the investigation—all factors that weigh in favor 
of a finding that he was in custody.160  While the Law Court recognized these facts, 
it nonetheless placed nearly all of its emphasis on the fact that the interview took 
place at the request and location of the probation officer.161   
Under the Court’s self-imposed charge to consider these factors “in their 
totality, not in isolation,”162 the Law Court should have conducted a more thorough 
analysis of the circumstances of Kittredge’s interview or weighed the factual 
findings against one another more evenly to determine if a finding of custody was 
warranted.  If the Court had more completely examined the applicability to each of 
the ten Michaud factors to the factual circumstances in its de novo review of the 
trial court’s decision,163 it may have come to a different conclusion about whether 
or not Kittredge was “in custody” when he made his incriminating statements. 
B.  Returning a Subjective Factor to the Analysis 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that determining 
whether a suspect is in custody for the purpose of Miranda warnings is a 
fundamentally objective analysis.164  While simpler to administer, a purely 
objective test fails to take into account certain circumstances, such as the personal 
characteristics or feelings of an individual, which may affect whether or not that 
person feels free to leave the interview—the crux of the objective test.165  Coercive 
tactics may often be used in interviews and interrogations with suspects and 
defendants;166 law enforcement officers are specially trained on how to speak with 
suspects and obtain confessions in ways that are legal, yet focused and 
aggressive.167  Police interrogations are designed to be “psychologically oriented,” 
taking place in rooms that isolate the suspect and make him or her 
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uncomfortable.168  One modern interrogation method, called the Reid technique, 
dictates a nine-step process for police to use when questioning a suspect.169  The 
purpose of the process, as explained by experts in the field of psychology, is “to get 
suspects to incriminate themselves by increasing the anxiety associated with denial, 
plunging them into a state of despair, and minimizing the perceived consequences 
of confession.”170  This type of pressure could impact an individual’s perception of 
whether they are free to leave an interrogation in a way that may not necessarily be 
captured by an exclusively objective test. 
A entirely subjective, case-by-case analysis is not likely feasible or desirable: 
if a purely subjective analysis was employed, law enforcement officers would need 
“to become de facto competency evaluators for custodial purposes . . . [which] 
would probably not be in accordance with their particular skill set or primary 
objective of apprehending unlawful individuals.”171  However, the addition of a 
defendant-specific factor, such as the subjective intent of the interviewing officer or 
the subjective belief of the defendant as to whether he or she was in custody, into 
the analysis could be a workable, fair alternative to the purely objective “in 
custody” test.  In Kittredge, for example, the trial court found as fact that Kittredge 
did not know whether he was free to leave the building172 and that the state troopers 
had information that made them believe Kittredge was involved in the crime prior 
to interviewing him.173  If considered by the Court, both of these facts could have 
tipped the scales in favor of a finding that Kittredge was in custody.  Although 
subjective factors were abandoned in favor of the simplicity of an objective test,174 
it is certainly feasible that some consideration of the officer’s intent or the 
defendant’s actual knowledge and belief be added back into the custodial 
analysis.175 
In fact, a defendant-specific factor infiltrated the purely objective approach to 
custody determinations at the United States Supreme Court level in a recent case, 
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J.D.B. v. North Carolina.176  In that case, a thirteen-year-old seventh-grader, 
J.D.B., was attending school and was taken from his classroom by a police officer 
in uniform.177  He was brought to a conference room where he was questioned by 
police for half an hour about some nearby break-ins in the neighborhood.178  The 
questioning began with small talk, but J.D.B. confessed that he was involved in the 
break-ins after learning that he could possibly go to a juvenile detention center.179  
Prior to the questioning, he was not read Miranda warnings, did not have the 
opportunity to talk with his grandmother (his caretaker), and was not told that he 
was free to leave the room.180  The Supreme Court, in its opinion, recognized that 
whether a suspect is in custody is an objective question.181  The Court explained 
that using an objective test is helpful because it avoids burdening police with 
having to anticipate a defendant’s “subjective state of mind” during an interview.182  
However, the Court continued by saying that “[i]n some circumstances, a child’s 
age ‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in the suspect’s position ‘would 
perceive his or her freedom to leave.’”183  The Court said it has “observed that 
children are generally less mature and responsible than adults; . . . they often lack 
the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that 
could be detrimental to them; and they are more vulnerable [than adults].”184  
Therefore, the Court held that so long as a child’s age is known to an officer at the 
time of questioning “or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable 
officer,” age should be included as a factor in the custody analysis.185 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Alito argued that the “[majority’s] decision 
shifts the Miranda custody determination from a one-size-fits-all reasonable-person 
test into an inquiry that must account for at least one individualized characteristic—
age—that is thought to correlate with susceptibility to coercive pressures . . . .”186  
The dissent points out that other characteristics may affect a person’s susceptibility 
to these pressures, which will lead to additional issues for the Court to resolve in 
the future.187  To solve these problems, the dissent explained, the Court will then 
have to “choose to limit today’s decision by arbitrarily distinguishing a suspect’s 
age from other personal characteristics—such as intelligence, education, 
occupation, or prior experience with law enforcement—that may also correlate 
with susceptibility to coercive pressures” or “be forced to effect a fundamental 
transformation of the Miranda custody test—from a clear, easily applied 
prophylactic rule into a highly fact-intensive standard resembling the voluntariness 
test that the Miranda Court found to be unsatisfactory.”188  In sum, the dissenters in 
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J.D.B. clearly believe that the door to the inclusion of other defendant-specific 
factors has opened, and this case could provide support for courts to allow some 
subjectivity to infiltrate the “in custody” test. 
In Maine, court opinions prior to Michaud did consider the subjective intent of 
the officer and the subjective beliefs of a suspect when determining if that person 
was in custody.189  Whether or not these or other subjective circumstances will be 
considered in future custody analyses remains to be seen.  Nonetheless, 
incorporating a defendant-specific component back into the custodial test would 
seem to be in sync with Maine’s past approach and could help provide results in a 
custody determination that account for more of the circumstances surrounding an 
interview and differences in individuals’ mental abilities and susceptibility to 
interrogative pressures. 
C.  A Policy that Encourages Recording Interviews and Interrogations 
Because the Law Court defers to the trial court’s factual findings to determine 
de novo if a person was in custody during questioning,190 it is crucial that these 
facts are accurate—especially facts that relate to whether a suspect was told he or 
she was free to leave, not under arrest, or that express the tone of the interview, as 
these factors can be indicative of whether an interview is or is not custodial under 
the Michaud test.191  One way to ensure an accurate recitation of events could be to 
encourage or require the recording of interviews and interrogations in order for 
statements to be admissible in court.  While there was a recorder in the room where 
Kittredge was questioned, it was not recording the interview “for reasons that 
[could not] be determined.”192  If it had been recording, the Law Court would have 
known for certain the tone of the interview, the attitude of the officers, what the 
officers told Kittredge about suspicions of his guilt, and other facts that the parties 
characterized differently in their briefs that may have impacted its custody 
determination. 
Several states already have judicially created requirements to record 
interrogations.  In 1985, “the Alaska Supreme Court held that ‘an unexcused failure 
to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention 
violates a suspect’s right to due process’” according to the state constitution.193  
Alaska was the first state to require that all custodial interrogations occurring in a 
place of detention be recorded.194  While Alaska is the only state to have gone as 
far as recognizing a due process right to the recording of interviews,195 courts in 
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Minnesota have followed suit by requiring that interviews be recorded.196  In both 
states, “with some exceptions, the court would suppress products of an unrecorded 
interview at trial.”197 
In 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court created recording 
requirements, but it took a slightly different approach.198  Instead of automatically 
excluding statements that have not been recorded, failure to electronically record a 
custodial interrogation “entitles the suspect to a favorable jury instruction.”199  
Later, in 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court changed its court rules to require 
that interrogations be recorded in all cases involving a violent crime,200 and in 
2009, the Indiana Supreme Court mandated that interviews be recorded for all 
felony cases via an amendment to the state’s rules of evidence.201 
Maine is one of a handful of states that has a statutory recording requirement, 
but the requirement is not all-inclusive.202  The statute currently only mandates that 
law enforcement have policies in place regarding the recording of interviews with 
suspects of “serious crimes” and that law enforcement preserve “investigative notes 
and records in such cases.”203  Expanding the circumstances in which recordings 
are required or adding an incentive to record interviews, such as a jury instruction 
favoring the defendant, could help to ensure that courts are examining accurate 
facts in cases involving custodial interrogations.  There are many other benefits to 
recording interviews as well: recordings create a permanent record of what 
occurred during an interview, including how officers treated the suspect being 
interviewed; motions to suppress statements based on police coercion are easily 
resolved by listening to the recorded interview; and the public’s confidence in the 
police and their practices increases because the recordings show that they have 
nothing to hide.204  Further, as evidenced in research collected by a lawyer, police 
officers, sheriffs, and prosecutors have indicated that a policy of recording 
interviews does not affect the police’s ability to obtain admissions in most 
instances.205 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Miranda warnings are necessary to the maintenance of a fair criminal justice 
system and to protect the constitutional rights of suspects and defendants.  To 
ensure these goals are met in practice, the Law Court should broaden its 
consideration of the factors it announced in State v. Michaud when determining 
whether a person is in custody during an interview or interrogation.  A more 
comprehensive analysis of the ten factors may also shed light on the weight and 
value that should be given to various factual circumstances, which would help 
develop more informative precedent to use in future cases.  Including a defendant-
specific factor into the analysis could be an additional way to protect suspects from 
coercive police tactics by recognizing that some individuals may react differently 
than others to certain situations and pressures.  A purely objective inquiry for 
Miranda purposes may be simpler to evaluate, but when the result affects whether 
or not a defendant’s confession is presented to a jury, the consequences of violating 
a person’s rights may outweigh the benefit of simplicity.  Maine should also 
consider a policy that incentivizes the recording of interviews and interrogations in 
which suspects make incriminating statements to ensure that the circumstances of a 
particular interview are accurately presented in a later proceeding.  If the Law 
Court had followed the alternative approaches in this Note, the result in Kittredge 
may have been different. 
The importance of an interrogation’s status as “custodial” cannot be 
overstated, and the method a court uses to arrive at that determination is the key.  
While Maine’s current test is comprehensive as to objective considerations, it 
should be reviewed to ensure that, in practice, it is achieving its intended result 
while protecting the rights of citizens against self-incrimination.  
